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Abstract 
Data has become a social and political issue not only because it concerns anyone who is connected 
to the Internet but also because it reconfigures relationships between states, subjects, and citizens. 
Just about every device is now connected to the Internet and generating vast quantities of digital 
traces about interactions, transactions and movements whether users are aware or not. What started 
as an ostensibly liberated space the Internet rapidly became the space over and through which 
governments and corporations began collecting, storing, retrieving, analysing, and producing data 
that analyses what people do and say on the Internet. This ranges from who communicates with 
whom, who goes where, and who says what – and much more besides. This is now being 
augmented with data that people produce about themselves, especially their relations, body 
movements and measurements; the amount and range of data that has become available is, as 
everyone now knows, staggering. This chapter introduces the main themes of the book to position 
these developments within a broad historical-sociological perspective and to articulate an 
international political sociology of data politics. 
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Introduction	
In 1983, Ian Hacking (2015) described the period between 1820 and 1840 as the ‘avalanche of 
printed numbers’ in Europe and America. Hacking was reflecting on Michel Foucault's concept of 
biopolitics that targeted ‘population’ with its own characteristics as an object of government in the 
nineteenth century. This invention was related to developments not least the birth of a science – 
statistics, Hacking's primary concern – but also associated sciences such as demography and 
probability, and data production practices such as the census and administrative registers. Hacking 
emphatically characterised that as the period when the ‘... statistical study of populations comes to 
amass gigantic quantities of data...’ (2015, 280).  
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As Hacking was identifying ‘gigantic quantities of data’ a new term was rapidly becoming popular 
in Euro-American languages: ‘personal computer’. The invention of large-scale data processing 
machines following the second world war was giving way to the miniaturisation of both processors 
and components of a computer – storage, graphics, controllers, and cooling. By the late 1980s a 
personal computer could already store and process all the ‘gigantic data’ collected about 
populations between 1820 and 1840. This would have been truly wondrous to William Farr (1807-
1883), a compiler of abstracts for the newly-founded (1836) Office of the Registrar-General of 
England and Wales who remained in office for forty years (2015, 284). Hacking recounts that it 
was Farr who pirated a Swedish computing machine with more than 5,000 moving parts for use in 
the Office of the Registrar-General (Hacking 2015, 291). Two centuries later, a hand-held device 
could store and process such gigantic data.  
Although the contemporary period has been described as the era of data revolution we insist that 
it be placed in a longer history (Kitchin 2014, Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier 2013). The personal 
computer of the 1980s morphed into a ubiquitous device of the twenty-first century, became 
connected with other devices through the internet (a word born in 1980), converged storing and 
processing of data with sharing, led to the invention of protocols for collecting, representing, and 
sharing of data, and generated not only an internet of people but also of things. Now, the amount 
of data generated and collected from these devices and the interests, authorities, and expertise 
required to render them useful make the data revolution of the 1820s appear rather miniscule but 
we need to understand the present as part of a broader historical transformation.  
When Edward Snowden, a security operative working for the CIA, walked out of his office for the 
last time in 2013 (thereafter he became an exile), to reveal that national security organisations had 
been ‘harvesting’ and ‘mining’ these gigantic masses of data generated by devices, he was carrying 
a small storage device capable of holding thousands times more data than was amassed between 
1820 and 1840 (Toxen 2014, Lyon 2014, Bauman et al. 2014). His act revealed not only the truly 
enormous quantities of data that have been amassed from devices about those who use them and 
their interconnections and communications but also the varieties of analytical and algorithmic 
technologies invented to analyse and interpret them. The question now is how to place the 1980-
2020 period within a broader historical transformation? 
This book attempts to step back from these developments to position them within a broad 
historical-sociological perspective to articulate an international political sociology of data politics. 
We offer it not to express awe in contemporary technological developments but draw attention to 
social and political practices and arrangements that made them possible. Unlike many interpreters, 
Hacking understood Foucault’s work as involving different histories of life, labour, and language 
and argued that Foucault provides both short and long histories of life (Hacking 2015, 279). He 
saw Foucault’s distinction between body politics (discipline) and biopolitics (regulation) as 
different perspectives on the same series: ‘There is a longer and a shorter story of biopolitics. The 
longer story gradually assumes a definite form in the mid-eighteenth century, and it continues 
today. Whereas Foucault's early books talked of sharp transformations, his research on sexuality 
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directs itself not to mutation and revolution but to evolution in the longer term. There is no 
inconsistency in this: the world knows both revolution and evolution’ (emphasis ours. Hacking 
2015, 281). The sharp change that Hacking detects in 1820-1840, he argued, belongs to the longer 
story of biopolitics. Moreover, he also admitted that 1820 and 1840 are arbitrary dates and more 
precisely these should be 1839 and 1848. Why? The gigantic accumulation of numbers actually 
bracketed two European political revolutions. ‘It represented an overt political response by the 
state. Find out more about your citizens, cried the conservative enthusiasts, and you will ameliorate 
their conditions, diminish their restlessness, and strengthen their character. Statistics, in that 
period, was called moral science: its aim was information about and control of the moral tenor of 
the population’ (2015, 281). Hacking then goes on to illustrate how calculating machines 
originated from the need to collect, store, and analyse these numbers and how the longer history 
of biopolitics made the conditions of possibility of the invention of statistics as a moral science of 
the state and how this science has driven calculating machine technologies in the late-nineteenth 
and early-twentieth centuries. Although there have been various studies since Hacking’s article 
that explored the rise of census, survey, and statistical technologies as developments of biopolitics 
(Porter 1986, Desrosières 1998), we want to see recent developments within a similar series.  
The purpose of this book is to think about recent transformations in data politics. In our 
introduction we position these in historical-sociological terms especially of the kind that Foucault 
and Bourdieu initiated and Hacking and others expanded and modified. For there are fundamental 
differences between empire-states amassing gigantic amounts of data for governing metropole and 
colonial populations in the nineteenth century and the complex assemblage of public and private 
authorities and interests invested in the production of data in the twenty-first century. This book is 
certainly about these differences. But it is also about situating these differences in relation to social, 
economic and political conditions when such a modern regime of government emerged and of 
which we are still subjects. As a contribution to international political sociology we want to 
consider the conditions of possibility of data politics as a field of power and knowledge (Bigo 
2011, Bigo and Walker 2007, Bonditti, Bigo, and Gros 2017).  
What	is	data	politics?	
If not for the rapid development of the internet and its connected devices ‘data’ would have 
probably remained a relatively obscure concept or term confined to these sciences. Yet, data has 
become a social and political issue not only because it concerns anyone who is connected to the 
Internet but also because it reconfigures relationships between states, subjects, and citizens. Just 
about every device is now connected to the Internet and generating vast quantities of digital traces 
about interactions, transactions and movements whether users are aware or not. What started as an 
ostensibly liberated space the Internet rapidly became the space over and through which 
governments and corporations began collecting, storing, retrieving, analysing, and presenting data 
that records what people do and say on the Internet. This ranges from who communicates with 
whom, who goes where, and who says what – and much more besides. This is now being 
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augmented with data that people collect about themselves, especially their relations, body 
movements and measurements; the amount and range of data that has become available is, as 
everyone now knows, staggering. There has never been a state, monarchy, kingdom, empire, 
government or corporation in history that has had command over such granular, immediate, varied 
and detailed data about subjects and objects that concern them. What exactly governments, 
corporations and a whole series of agencies and authorities collect, analyse and deploy is complex 
but it is now generally understood that data has become a major object of economic, political and 
social investment for governing subjects. This development has been captured by the term ‘big 
data’ to mark a departure from conventional forms of data and statistical knowledge. While first 
coined by industry, big data has come to have different meanings and uses but significantly, and 
along with the increasing ubiquity of data in everyday life, the term has become less prominent. 
Notably, attention has started shift to a focus on computation and analytics such as algorithms, 
machine learning, artificial intelligence and the internet of things. Yet, data remains a key matter 
of concern as both the product and condition of computation and analytics. 
Scholarship on these developments has understandably focused on issues concerning surveillance, 
privacy, anonymity, and types of conduct that the Internet cultivates about always connected, 
always measured selves. Perhaps equal to the measure of the influence of the Internet there has 
been scholarship on data ranging from warnings about its consequences (surveillance, privacy, 
isolation) to types of conduct (racism, misogyny, bullyism). Along with this, numerous studies, 
reports, guidelines, regulations and legislation concerning data protection and the rights of data 
subjects have proliferated.  
Data Politics builds on this scholarship but it aims to make three distinct yet interrelated 
contributions to an international political sociology of data politics. 
The first concerns a shift in focus from the politics of or in data to data as a force that is generative 
of politics. In this view, rather than settled in databases or archives, data is a force realised through 
its production, uptake and deployments. We want to draw the implications of thinking about data 
not as an inert representation but a language with performative force as Bourdieu (1993, 1973) and 
Butler (1997) have shown. That is, data politics is concerned with not only political struggles over 
data production and its deployments, but how data is generative of new forms of power relations 
and politics at different and interconnected scales. If indeed data enacts that which it represents, 
this signifies two things. To collect, store, retrieve, analyse, and present data through various 
methods means to bring those objects and subjects that data speaks of into being. Data sciences 
such as statistics, probability, and analytics have emerged not because they have merely quenched 
our curiosities but because these sciences have been useful for the objects and subjects they have 
brought into being for the purposes of governing and/or profit. And, to speak constantly about data 
as though it either represents or records subjects and objects and their movements independent 
from the social and political struggles that govern them is to mask such struggles. 
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That data is generative of new power relations and politics is evident in the recent struggles over 
how big data was allegedly used in the US election and UK referendum to create personalised 
political advertising to influence how people voted. Referring to these electoral uses, George 
Monbiot writing in the Guardian noted that we must act now to own these new political 
technologies before they own us. He was of course referring to the work of a company called 
Cambridge Analytica, which was partly owned by US billionaire Robert Mercer, who also happens 
to be a friend of former UKIP leader Nigel Farage. It was widely reported that the company 
allegedly influenced both the US election and the UK referendum by mining data from Facebook 
and using it to create profiles predicting people’s personalities and then tailoring advertising to 
their psychological profiles. While some of the claims that this happened were brought into 
question including denials from Cambridge Analytica, UK’s privacy watchdog – the Information 
Commissioners Office – deemed there was sufficient cause to launch an inquiry. These claims and 
denials were soon followed by the disclosure that the personal information of up to 87 million 
users was harvested without their permission by an app designed by a Cambridge academic. The 
seriousness of this breach intensified when Cambridge Analytica claimed that hundreds of 
companies harvest such data and that it is legal to do so. Or when the Cambridge academic at the 
centre of the controversy claimed that it was both legal and ethically acceptable to sell data to a 
third party. Or when CEO Mark Zuckerberg admitted that Facebook took no action to ensure that 
the tens of thousands of apps it approved adhered to their terms of service. 
So, in the wake of already uneven power and influence over electoral processes – such as campaign 
financing and media alliances – we now have misinformation, disinformation and techniques such 
as bot-swarming whereby fake online accounts are created to give the impression that large 
numbers of people support a political position. For these reasons, Oscar Gandy recently argued 
that this calls for a shift of attention away from a focus on privacy or surveillance and the collection 
and processing of information to how information is being used and misused (in: Gandy and Tsui 
2018).  
What these examples illustrate is that data and politics are inseparable. Data is not only shaping 
our social relations, preferences and life chances but our very democracies. And that is how we 
want to speak of data politics. However, a problem with these views on data politics are the 
subjects who are constituted as the addressee and are presumably the affected Internet subjects. 
This is the second intervention that has led us to articulate what we call data politics. It concerns 
atomism: often such pronouncements address atomised individuals who need to protect themselves 
from the dangers of the Internet and its manipulations. It is based on the ontological premise of 
‘hyper-individualism’ whereby persons, events and phenomena are treated as independent and 
‘atomistic’ entities (Lake 2017). Data politics that emerges from this reaction is one of urging 
people to protect themselves as individuals. It is almost as if the narrative says ‘yes, there is 
collective work that needs done but ultimately it is up to you to change your behaviour to protect 
yourself from the dark forces of the Internet.’ The addressee in other words is the atomized subject 
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whose data is individualised rather than understood as a product of collective relations with other 
subjects and technologies (Socialising Big Data Project 2015). 
A third intervention concerns the immediacy that pervades these reactions or responses. They are 
predominantly exercised by the immediacy of a threat, danger, menace, risk, or peril or insecurity 
or unease that the Internet ostensibly engenders. Even those who have fought battles with 
governments and corporations to expose their data practices fall prey to a Messianic creep in 
articulating political problems by decrying their immediacy.  
The obverse response to these reactions has been to extol the virtues of the Internet and illustrate 
that if it is not liberating it is at least making our lives better organized, measured, improved, 
whatever. Yes, there may be dangers and insecurities but this is a small price to pay for the benefits 
it brings. This response is still riddled with immediacy and atomism. Its calculative logic is from 
the point of view of the atomized subject weighing the pros and cons of the Internet against the 
threats of immediacy.  
All this has led us to the conclusion that data politics is yet to find its subjects. This book attempts 
to step back from the inertness, atomism and immediacy of the dominant points of view of the 
Internet and the data it generates and ask questions about data politics and position these within a 
broad historical-sociological perspective. What do we then mean by an international political 
sociology of data politics? 
We start with the assumption that the will to knowledge and the will to power are two aspects of 
how we conduct ourselves and the conduct of others and thus we approach data not as a 
representation (i.e., information collected, stored, and presented without interest) but as an object 
whose production interests those who exercise power. This was at least one of the lessons we have 
learned from Michel Foucault’s studies of the ways in which modern societies come to depend on 
governing subjects with data collected over not only their physical and social attributes (life, 
language, labour) but also about the conduct of their behaviour (Foucault 2007). Our second 
assumption is that the production of data is a social and often political practice that mobilizes 
agents who are not only objects of data (about whom data is produced) but that they are also 
subjects of data (those whose engagement drives how data is produced). Our question thus shifts 
to social practices and agents. Just as the avalanche of numbers was an aspect of the birth of a 
modern regime of government, in our age data does not happen through unstructured social 
practices but through structured and structuring fields in and through which various agents and 
their interests generate forms of expertise, interpretation, concepts, and methods that collectively 
function as fields of power and knowledge. This was at least one of the lessons we learned from 
Pierre Bourdieu’s studies on the ways in which fields of knowledge constitute fields of power 
(Bourdieu 1988) that involve struggle and change, fragile moments, and the emergence of new 
kinds of practices (Bigo 2011). 
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Foucault and Bourdieu influenced a generation of scholars who have taken up the relations 
between power, knowledge, and fields and investigated the ways in which states, agencies, 
organizations, corporations, and institutions – often assembled in different combinations as 
governments – constituted their authority, legitimacy and legality by producing knowledge about 
objects and subjects through establishing method and data regimes such as censuses, indexes, 
indicators, registers, rolls, catalogues, logs, and archives. We now understand much better the 
relationships between state formation and statistics, probability, and data regimes (Desrosières 
1998, Hacking 1990, Porter 1986). Statistics, from their very beginning, combined ‘the norms of 
the scientific world with those of the modern, rational state’ (Desrosières 1998). These data 
regimes have now been extensively studied as historical developments. The birth of objects of 
knowledge such as the economy, population, society and their sciences – originally called political 
arithmetic and now statistics — have also been studied extensively. Although it would be 
impossible to summarize what we now know about these data regimes and the state, the overall 
insight we have gained can be stated as follows. While Max Weber’s argument that the sovereignty 
of the state consists in its monopoly of the means of violence is often cited, following the studies 
of Foucault and Bourdieu and the literature inspired by them, we have come to recognize that this 
sovereignty depends on numerous practices beyond the organization of violence. Historically, the 
state performs sovereignty with control over and dependence on especially education, fiscal and 
cultural data regimes. This does not mean that citizens in each state did not influence, interfere, or 
intervene in the ways which data regimes constituted them as data subjects. On the contrary, 
scholars have also investigated and documented how citizens have developed democratic practices 
to challenge social categories of data regimes and their effects (Anderson and Fienberg 2000, 
Kertzer and Arel 2002, Nobles 2000). There are many cases that illustrate how, for example, 
census categories such as race, ethnicity, gender, and other indexes have been called into question, 
subverted, and transformed.  
Nonetheless, the state, or rather organizations, institutions, agencies, agents, and authorities that 
make up the complex field of government, maintained an effective monopoly on data regimes 
concerning whole populations. This is not to say that corporations did not also generate data about 
their customers especially over the last century or so but this was largely limited to specific 
population groups and in relation to narrow concerns. Beginning in the early twentieth century, 
opinion polling and marketing research were considerable developments in corporate forms of 
population data generation (Osborne and Rose 1999). And although there have been various 
international organisations that have entered into fields of data generation and accumulation such 
as the United Nations, the European Union, Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
Development and International Labour Organisation, the primary site and scene of collection of 
population data and its various regimes remained the monopoly of the state for nearly four 
centuries. 
This monopoly of the state over data production, collection and even interception is increasingly 
challenged. Or, at least, state sovereignty over data regimes is now shared by the birth of entirely 
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new assemblages of the production of data (Kitchin 2014). Not least has been the increasing 
accumulation and mobilisation of data by corporations (Thrift 2005). It is tempting to immediately 
single out the Internet and its connected devices as the source of this challenge. But it is much 
more complicated than that as our argument above anticipates. It would be folly to assume that 
Internet technologies develop independently from the interests that constitute the fields through 
which various data regimes have been invented. However, beyond technological developments, 
the sovereignty of the state in accumulating and producing data about its population, territory, 
health, wealth, and security is being challenged by corporations, agencies, authorities, and 
organizations that are producing myriad data about subjects whose interactions, transactions and 
movements traverse borders of states in new and complicated patterns. Not least these traversals 
challenge the methodological nationalism that has dominated statistical thought and practice and 
their corresponding boundaries of population data, knowledge and power for centuries (Scheel et 
al. 2016). While Bourdieu’s studies focused on the nation and in particular France, others have 
taken up his conception to understand fields as international and transnational (Dezalay and Garth 
1996, Madsen 2011, 2014). For Bigo, the transnational exists in the form of transnational networks 
and practices of professionals who ‘play simultaneously in domestic and transnational fields’ 
(Bigo 2011). In this view, a transnational field is constituted by networks and practices between 
and amongst professionals who act at various non-hierarchically ordered scales of the 
transnational, national and local (Scheel et al. 2016).  
We have divided the book into what we consider as three domains of data politics: worlds, subjects, 
rights.  In the first part, we discuss some key conditions of possibility of these domains of data 
politics and then in the next three parts the importance of each domain. We pose key questions that 
are not exhaustive of possible inquiries and then summarise the contributions of each chapter. 
Taken together the chapters of this book set out political questions about the ways in which data 
has been constituted as an object vested with certain powers, influence, and rationalities. 
Part	1:	The	conditions	of	possibility	of	data	politics		
Part 1 addresses some of the conditions of possibility of data politics and through which new 
worlds are produced, new subjects come into being, and new rights emerge from struggles over 
the ownership, collection, analysis, and storage of data. The chapters in this part reveal some of 
the complexities of these conditions. In Chapter 2 Paul Edwards examines the role of 
infrastructures as one condition of possibility and specifically those of environmental data systems 
that have been built over a long period of time and are now being undermined by the Trump 
administration’s attack on climate science in the USA. He demonstrates how data analysis models 
(or algorithms) that mine, collate, organise, and present data and their interoperability and 
compatibility have become infrastructures of knowledge about the earth’s climate. These data 
models he argues have now become primary worlds of struggle over knowledge about climate 
change. He deftly illustrates the tension between critiques of algorithms which critical data 
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scientists advance and the consequences of eliminating such data models as infrastructures of 
knowledge.  
In Chapter 3 David Berry thinks ‘beyond data’ to critically consider their algorithmic 
underpinnings and connections to a wider political economy and across multiple levels of 
computational systems. He examines the complexity of understanding the code that underlies data 
models or algorithms. Berry points out a paradox of the internet where billions of people 
communicate on the basis of a language that is hardly visible or comprehensible to them: the code. 
So, while the Internet may depend on a massive infrastructure of servers, devices, and cables what 
brings them together or more precisely what holds them together and enables them to communicate 
with each other is this special kind of language. But to understand code is anything but 
straightforward because code itself embodies various programming and communication languages 
such as binary machine code to algorithms (Galloway 2006). The Internet has a language but it is 
hardly visible or even comprehensible to those who do not write such code. How does the language 
of the Internet traverse both actual and virtual worlds of data? Berry argues that the struggles over 
the language of the internet and its code takes place simultaneously with the struggles over 
‘natural’ languages and their use and abuse. The question then becomes to what extent those who 
write code enable and shape the former. In regards to this question he argues for a critical theory 
of algorithms (CTA) to examine ‘the particular historical conditions that give the present its shape 
in relation to the specific material and ideological formations that algorithms introduce into the 
social and economic conditions of society.’  
In Chapter 4 David Lyon focuses on how everyday life in the twenty-first century is unavoidably 
surveillant, especially in the increasingly data-dependent Global North and South. This condition 
is led by giant Internet corporations such as Google who promote data capture and analysis as the 
new fuel for prosperity and progress, which raises profound questions for the politics of data and 
everyday life. Lyon frames his discussion of this condition in terms of two wide-ranging concepts, 
surveillance capitalism and surveillance culture, which both depend on data but often in different 
ways and with different consequences. He argues that surveillance capitalism is the source of 
systems that enable many aspects of surveillance culture, and that at present much that counts as 
surveillance culture is supportive of surveillance capitalism. But, he contends, this is not inevitable, 
as evident in the case of the Facebook scandal of 2018. The conditions of possibility – surveillance 
data in this case – do not produce predetermined outcomes. Instead, Lyon argues that  a meaningful 
data politics can emerge through the reassertion of human dignity and especially agency in 
responses to surveillance capitalism.  
Each of the following parts of the book provide more detailed investigations of the worlds, 
subjects, and rights that emerge under these conditions of possibility of data politics.  
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Part	2:	The	Worlds	of	Data	politics	
The Internet is an elaborate infrastructure composed of objects, equipment, cables, routers, servers, 
switches and devices that constitute a unique technological materiality. Unlike other massive 
material transformations of industrial and post-industrial cities and their transportation and 
communication infrastructures, the materiality of the Internet is mostly out of sight and located 
elsewhere. The data servers and data farms are often in faraway and remote locations or nestled 
within cities that are inaccessible and unknown to most people. Its connectors are often buried 
under the earth or sea. Its wireless communications are invisible but routers, switches, and masts 
create strange yet recognizable objects within and outside cities. Without this massive 
infrastructure and its maintenance and production the internet of things, communications, and 
exchanges would be impossible. The material infrastructure of the Internet not only generates new 
logics of borders and capacities of control that remain often invisible but also protocols and 
platforms that make people think the Internet is made up of a seamless and invisible flow of 
information. How are these worlds created and governed? What are the material conditions of 
possibility, configurations, and stratifications of these worlds? How do these worlds straddle or 
cross between offline and online worlds? To think of worlds is to trace how material conditions of 
the Internet are critical infrastructures that are generative of politics and struggles.  
Through the Internet a new space is being made – a cyberspace perhaps – but understanding this 
space is fraught with difficulties. The Internet has not only blurred the boundaries between online 
and offline worlds but it has also rendered the distinction between the two spurious and perhaps 
untenable. With always-connected devices it is impossible to say when people or things are offline 
or online or indeed to separate embodied subjects from their operation. What kind of space does 
the Internet generate? What is the role of data in such a space and how does data make it possible? 
In turn, how does the Internet and the space it generates make data politics possible and with what 
effects? In Chapter 5 Ron Deibert and Louis Pauly take up some of these questions by illustrating 
how states have been attempting to impose their borders on cyberspace. The expansion and 
intensification of controls over cyberspace by states within conventionally conceived territorial 
boundaries are well known. But they argue that states simultaneously project power in and through 
global cyberspace outside of their territorial jurisdictions. They remind us that struggles over 
cyberspace do not stop at borders and that extraterritorial projections of state power through 
cyberspace are expanding, deepening, and becoming more elaborate. They create a sophisticated 
image of cyberspace as a site of international politics and struggles between various national and 
international authorities. 
The emergence of big data with its focus on production, accumulation, mining, circulation, 
aggregation, analysis and interpretation has also engendered the formation of various professions 
from data scientists to data journalists. Each of these professions is engaged in competitive 
struggles between each other and with other professions and yet at the same time also reinforce 
the broader practice of investing data with powers. These emergent professions and their practices 
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have not only begun reorganizing existing fields of data production such as the official statistics 
of states (state and statistics share common etymologies) but also have given birth to new forms 
of data accumulation and valuation whose source of authority and legitimacy traverse the 
boundaries of state sovereignties and produce international effects.  
In this light, data is not an already given artefact that exists (which then needs to be mined, 
analysed, brokered) but an object of investment (in the broadest sense) that is produced by the 
competitive struggles of professionals who claim stakes in its meaning and functioning. They 
engage in struggles over the valuation of different forms of capital conceived by Bourdieu 
including cultural, economic, social, and symbolic capital (Bigo 2013). It is through the 
accumulation of these various forms of capital that their relative positions are established within 
the field (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992). The emergence of data as a field and data professionals 
as its custodians and gatekeepers shapes competitive struggles not only in defining an object but 
also the principles of how to understand and intervene in data politics. At the same time, algorithms 
increasingly call into question the very expertise that data accumulation has spawned through the 
automating practices of judgement. Who decides whether to invest, what to listen to, where to eat, 
where to stay, and where to go? How do algorithms embed expert judgements and normative 
assumptions without appearing to do so? In Chapter 6 Didier Bigo and Laurent Bonelli examine 
these issues through their analysis of the emergence of data production as a field and intelligence 
professionals as its producers. They argue that competitive struggles not only shape the defining 
of data as an object but also the principles of how to understand and intervene in what we call data 
politics. Through a Bourdieusian, international political sociology-inspired analysis, they illustrate 
the emergence of a transnational space where the production of security data occurs to argue 
against the illusionary idea of the intelligence community as a single world united by common 
surveillance techniques which are changing the understanding of security. Rather, they highlight 
how logics of action cut across and transgress distinctions between the internal and the external, 
the national and the foreigner.   
The accumulation of data procures not only cultural capital but also economic capital. An economy 
of data is founded on the ‘voluntary’ input of personal data in exchange for Internet services. This 
creates the conditions for the making of a stock market of data involving data brokers and profit 
shares generated by deep data mining and data discoveries. How do individuals contribute to this 
production and what is the political economy of desire that generates a material economy of 
services? What are the consequences of subjects giving up data in return for so-called free 
services? What are the legal conditions that enable and disable the circulation of data within and 
across states? From questions of data commons to data ownership, how are legal regimes being 
challenged and remade by struggles over data as property? 
In Chapter 7 Tommaso Venturini takes up some of these questions through a focus on what is at 
stake with ‘fake news’ as a key object of data politics. He illustrates that that misleading term 
conceals that the production of news and production of truth in general always involve interpretive 
struggles and a competition between interests to establish authority and expertise. Rather than 
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considering it an object of algorithmic intelligence, computational analytics or political intentions, 
he proposes an understanding of fake news based on its circulation rather than its contents. He 
proposes that it is more appropriate to consider circulating stories as ‘junk news’ and describes its 
economic, communicational, technological, cultural and political dimensions. In this way, 
Venturini shifts attention to our ability to discern between news and junk as an important object 
of debate and discussion and form of data politics. 
Felix Tréguer in Chapter 8 considers how data politics is embodied in security assemblages – 
combinations of technology companies and security professionals – and how their practices are 
increasingly shaping how the state governs its citizens. He illustrates how these assemblages are 
leading to a new technological bureaucratisation of the state that transforms citizens’ 
understanding of  themselves as subjects of government. His chapter identifies the need to resist 
the technological bureaucratisation of the state as a significant element of data politics today – a 
theme that is picked up by chapters in Parts 3 and 4. 
Part	3:	The	subjects	of	data	politics		
The emergence of data as an object of government engenders the emergence of subjects who take 
positions in and through the various resignifications and challenges that it spawns. Rather than 
occupying already existing positions, subjects are produced through various digital interactions 
and at the same time their digital traces shape and organize their subjectivities and how they are 
known and governed. How are subjects part of the work and making of data through which they 
then come to be known? Through procedures of channelling, filtering and sorting data, various 
devices and platforms configure not only transactions and interactions but the data they generate 
recursively shapes and forms subjects in never fixed but modulating ways. With the increasing 
circulation, mining and combining of data how are subjects and their affiliations, connections and 
relations multiplied and governed via ever more dispersed micro data politics? 
People govern their health by making themselves data subjects of health. Measuring their own 
performances with Internet-enabled devices and benchmarking their performance against other 
performers, data subjects of health increasingly calibrate a model body not through images 
circulated by the advertising industry but by literally working themselves out through their data 
performances and for others. How is data part of the making and shaping of bodies and the body a 
site of data politics? Being a data subject entails the radically shifting meaning of being a consumer 
from a subject making choices to a choice-making and sorted subject. Being constantly a reviewer, 
modern consuming data subjects are caught in a spiral of evaluations: they are evaluated and 
evaluator all at once and all the time. Recommender platforms and evaluation data generated by 
transacting ever more sort subjects into categories of cultural preferences that narrow and channel 
choices. How is consuming through the Internet generative of data politics?  
In Chapter 9 Lina Dencik and Arne Hintz consider some of these questions of the data subject in 
relation to the uneven effects of data-driven surveillance practices which simultaneously advance 
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particular social, economic and political agendas that enfranchise some whilst disenfranchising 
others, and prioritize certain ways of organizing society at the expense of others. It is in relation to 
such concerns that they consider the possibility of data justice. They note that much resistance to 
surveillance has predominantly centred on techno-legal responses relating to the development and 
use of encryption and policy advocacy around privacy and data protection. They argue that data 
surveillance should be considered in relation to broader social justice politics. If there is an 
emergent surveillance capitalism in which the collection, use and analysis of our data increasingly 
comes to shape the opportunities and possibilities available to us then we must ask broader 
questions of data justice.  
The practices that produce data subjects also involve changing relations of production in the 
generation of data including the production of its labourers. Are we moving from the logic of 
having a job to a logic of contributing something to the fulfilment of a task? The data-generated 
market of global tasks has now created a vast meeting place for those who need and will pay for 
accomplishing specific and often micro tasks and those who can and need to fulfil these tasks to 
make a living. To consider the data subject also calls upon consideration of the uncanny 
convergence between robots and humans not in the way in which the cyborg manifesto (Haraway 
1991) envisaged it but perhaps more in the manner in which Star Trek anticipated. How does the 
automated generation and analysis of data based on artificial intelligence and machine learning 
appear autonomous and yet inseparable from struggles and relations between programmers, 
subjects and technologies? In Chapter 10 Brett Neilsen and Ned Rossiter approach these questions 
through the examination of data centres as sites of data politics. They show how data centres are 
increasingly moving toward automated economies with the integration of artificial intelligence, 
machine learning and robotics into processes of capital accumulation. These data infrastructures 
should be considered sites of struggle not only because of where they are located but also how they 
have become hubs of command and control over production, consumption, and exchange circuits. 
Understanding how these centres regulate logistics by which various forms of capital is 
accumulated and how labour transitions to a society of automation for them is a key political 
question and field of struggle. For them, ‘data politics are not exclusive to the claiming of rights 
so much as the production of subjectivity within environments whose data architectures register 
conflicts between the politics of decentralisation-centralisation and the impossibility of pure 
distribution’. 
Data not only captures but also colonizes minds, souls, bodies and spaces. It subjectifies through 
practices of production, accumulation, aggregation, circulation, valuation, and interpretation. 
These practices call upon subjects who are not separate from but submit to and are active in the 
various ways that data is made and colonizes lifeworlds to constitute ‘data’s empire’. In Chapter 
11, Engin Isin and Evelyn Ruppert examine the various ways that data captures and colonizes 
minds, souls, bodies and spaces and makes data subjects through practices of production, 
accumulation, aggregation, circulation, valuation, and interpretation. They draw our attention to 
the fact that these practices operate together yet differently in the metropole and postcolony and 
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produce different data subjects. They remind us how European empires in the nineteenth century 
invented various data collection and analysis methods for producing colonial populations and how 
contemporary practices build on these imperial infrastructures and logics. They invite readers to 
understand developments such as UN Global Pulse as instances of postcolonial data politics, which 
call for decolonising data politics. 
Part	4:	The	emerging	rights	in	data	politics		
If the accumulation of data traverses subjects it also constitutes them with claims to certain rights 
that concern its accumulation: who owns, distributes, sells, accesses, uses, appropriates, modifies, 
and signifies data become objects of struggles for claiming rights to such modalities. The rights 
claiming subject is the figure of the citizen that we have inherited as a political subject who is now 
making rights claims about being a subject of data. How do subjects exercise and claim such rights 
through what they say and do through the Internet? How do they perform rights and claims about 
being subjects of data through how they communicate, share, express and engage with digital 
devices and platforms? How do they invent data practices that challenge and subvert state and 
corporate forms of data and struggle for rights through legal and regulatory mechanisms?  
This third condition of data politics considers rights claiming subjects such as citizen data scientists 
as part of material-political arrangements and struggles over who generates, legitimizes and has 
authority over data and how data is mobilized to make claims for environmental and other rights. 
It concerns how citizens make data an object of transnational politics and engage in struggles 
around free expression, privacy and ethics and the forums, practices and networks through which 
these struggles are being fought. In Chapter 12 Giovanni Ziccardi shifts our attention from the 
collection and collation of data to consider rights over its life and death. He discusses the whole 
‘life cycle’ of data, especially from a legal-informatics point of view and with particular attention 
to the right to oblivion after the death of a person and how this constitutes a different kind of right. 
He discusses the complexities of the European Union General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) 
and the impossibility of data oblivion. Rather, he argues that the right to data oblivion requires 
simultaneously addressing three forms of oblivion that make it up: social, which concerns the 
persistence and circulation of personal data; technical, which relates to the resistance of technology 
to the removal of data; and legal, which refers to forgetting, deleting and de-indexing elaborated 
by legal means through case law or norms. 
How are rights not only claimed through regulations, laws, and protocols but by citizens who make 
claims and in turn perform what is data politics through their everyday digital acts? In Chapter 13 
Jennifer Gabrys takes up this question by shifting our attention from data as something collected 
about citizens to many instances where citizens generate their own data. Whether to document 
lived experiences through social media platforms, sensing air pollution to challenge governmental 
measurements, or documenting conflict in overlooked zones, citizens are collecting, analysing and 
communicating data to articulate alternative narratives. These practices of data citizens not only 
challenge official practices for making evidence, they also potentially reinvent how rights are 
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formed, expressed and transformed through ongoing data practices. Gabrys show how citizen 
practices of using low-cost and digital sensor technologies to monitor air quality and changing 
urban environments generate distinct forms of data politics through the operationalization of new 
data and data relations.  
The relationship between the right to privacy and that of data protection is illustrative of the 
transversal relations and legal and political tensions that make up data politics. On the one hand, 
international human rights laws and obligations seek to secure and universalize the former and 
various national regimes have emerged to address the latter. However, transversal relations call 
for a figure of a citizen that is different from the subject we have inherited and instead one who 
can make rights claims that traverse national borders (Isin and Ruppert 2015). In Chapter 14 
Elspeth Guild illustrates an emerging field of international law where data citizens are able to 
command and have control over their privacy. Guild notes that citizens have discovered to their 
shock how little control their own state authorities have over the protection of their privacy and 
shows that the global movement of communications, internet and social media platforms makes a 
citizen’s right to privacy impossible to regulate and protect at the national level. Guild documents 
how since 2013 a number of authorities, interests, and forces have come together to create an 
international framework for privacy in a digital age. It is a framework that is emerging as a 
consequence of data citizens contesting and seeking to establish their rights to privacy by using 
the intersection of international and national law as a nexus through which to achieve their claims. 
Conclusion	
This book invites readers to regard contemporary transformations as a field of power and 
knowledge and an emerging regime of government that is comparable yet irreducible to the modern 
regime government that emerged in the nineteenth century and of which we are still subject. It 
provides an analytical framing with a focus on worlds, subjects, and rights as conditions of 
possibility of such a field. Our hope is that the book contributes to our understanding of this field 
and the possibilities of data subjects becoming data citizens. 
Notes
1 An earlier version of this chapter appeared as a commentary and invitation to contributors to this book: (Ruppert, 
Isin, and Bigo 2017).  
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